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DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE MAR 9 1968 REPLY
TO SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)(U)
1. (U) Type Operation: Mortar, rocket, automatic/small arms,
and ground attacks against Tan Son Nhut Air Base and the Tan Son Nhut
Sensitive Area. 5. (U) Unit Commanders Engaged in Operations: a. Lt Colonel Luu Kim Cuong Comdr, 33rd VNAF Wing (Comdr., TSN Sensitive Area) b. Major Phung Van Chieu Comdr, TSN Sensitive Point Dep Comdr, TSN Sensitive Areac. Colonel Farley E. Peebles Comdr, 377th Combat Support Gp d. Colonel Luther J. Miller Senior Advisor AFAT #1 33rd Wing GROUP ' 4 (This Page is Unclassified) 6. (U) Units Engaged: a. 2nd Services Battalion (ARVN) b. 8th Airborne Battalion (ARVN) c. 53rd Regional Force Battalion (ARVN) d. 1st Marine Battalion (ARVN) e. 4th Marine Battalion (ARVN) f. 377th SPS g. Task Force 35 h. Task Force Peter i. A Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment j. 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry 25th Division k. 1st Battalion, 18th INF, 1st Division l. 2nd Battalion, 27th INF, 25th Division m. 2nd Battalion, 327th Regiment, 101st Division n. 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, 25th Division o. 1 Platoon Armed Helicopters - 120th Aviation CO p. 3 Counter Mortar Radar Sites q. Provisional Battle Group - (Hong Tong Tay Depot Area) r. 1 Platoon 105mm - ARVN Artillery (TSN) - JDOC s. 1
Platoon 155mm - ARVN Artillery (Co Loa) - JDOC u. 1 Tank Platoon, 33rd VNAF Wing Defense Control Group - JDOC (This
Page is Unclassified) w. 150 USAF Augmentees to 377th SPS (Law Enforcement Section for escort of personnel from Saigon Area). x. VNAF and 7 th AF TACC y. 1 Battery 105mm 25 INF Division z. A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Division aa. Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area Advisory Team 7. 7. © Intelligence: a. Pre-attack Intelligence: (1) Intelligence reports plus raw information received by JDOC 30 days prior to the attack indicated to this level of command that some kind of enemy action would occur during the TET holiday season. The intelligence estimate of the situation gave the enemy a capability of mounting a large scale rocket or mortar attack plus a ground attack with a strength of not more than a reinforced battalion. A training exercise was written on 24 January 1968 and distributed to the Commanders concerned for appraisal and subsequent implementation on the night of 26-27 January 1968. The exercise was designed to test the capabilities of all security forces assigned to the TSN Sensitive Area. The 051 Gate, considered the most vulnerable point of the perimeter and the anticipated enemy avenue of approach from the Cambodian border was selected as the practice enemy point of penetration, Practice condition YELLOW was initiated at 0025 hours, 27 January 1968. Exercise TET was conducted, including a commanders' critique at 0500 hours at the JDOC Command Post. (2) The intelligence situation for the days immediately preceding the attack remained relatively unchanged from the normal. There was no significant input of information indicating that an enemy attack on Tan Son Nhut was imminent. Intelligence collection agencies identified no significant changes of the location, posture, or strength of the enemy forces in the area. (3) At 1020 hours, 30 January 1968, the Commander,, 377th SPS, declared Security Alert Condition Grey in effect for his unit in reaction to the increased enemy activity during the TET truce and the decrease of the Vietnamese Defense Force units due to the holidays. (4) At 1732 hours, 30 January 1968, the 377th SPS was placed in Security Alert Condition RED (Option I) by order of the Commander, Seventh Air Force. The Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC) tried to confirm the unilateral Air Force Security Condition RED (Option I) through U.S. Army channels with negative results, All forces within the TSNSA remained in Security Alert Condition White except the 377th SPS and Task Force 35, which were in Condition RED, and all other TSN Defense Forces which were in Condition YELLOW. b. Post-attack Intelligence Information: The following information has been collected from numerous intelligence sources, including Seventh Air Force, MACV, and agencies directly supporting the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area. (1) The attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base was an integral part of the enemy offensive against the Gia Dinh Province and the government of the Republic of South Vietnam. (2) It has been asserted that plans for the attack of Tan Son Nhut were formulated and discussed by the Viet Cong cadre as early as 22 December 1967. In subsequent meetings, the attack was planned for the period preceding the TET holidays. 4 (3) Intelligence sources reflect that an estimated nine enemy battalions were in the greater Saigon Area, and at least seven of them were involved in the attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The enemy battalions in the greater Saigon area were augmented and supported by approximately twelve identified companies or larger-size elements of the 5th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.(4) Although all units involved in the attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base have not been clearly identified, specific actions of the enemy and the designations of the attacking units have been established. The roles of enemy units and their identities are discussed below: (a) Unidentified elements of the enemy directed automatic weapons fire onto the installation in the direction of the POL Storage Area and the C-130 Parking Area. This fire came from an off base position on the east end of the airfield near the runway approaches. (b) Heavy pressure from enemy elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion and the 2nd Local Force Battalion was exerted on the Joint General Staff Headquarters, located adjacent to the southeast perimeter of the installation, and a subsequent penetration by these units was made through the southeast peri'meter fence of JGS. © Heavy small arms fire was directed towards Gate #2 by unconfirmed enemy elements. These elements were probably assigned to the 2nd Local Force Battalion and the C-10 Sapper Battalion. (d) Enemy elements, probably from the 6th Local Force Battalion and the C-10 Sapper Battalion, assaulted the south entry control point of the MACV Annex, approximately 250 meters southeast of the of the base perimeter fence. This enemy force is estimated to have been a reinforced CO (200+). 5 (e) Enemy forces estimated at four reinforced battalions mounted an offensive against the west perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The units involved and their probable tactical deployment are indicated below. The three principal, battalion-size units were positioned in column at the time of the assault. 1. Elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion approached the fence line via Lambretta taxi on National Highway #1. The sapper elements dismounted the vehicle and detonated what is believed to have been a Bangalore Torpedo on the fence line. The explosion opened a section of the outer perimeter fence, and the breach was used continuously by the enemy forces for entry onto the installation. The same elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion remained with the initial assault force and penetrated the perimeter. The staging area of the sapper element was in the vicinity of Phu Cuong Village, approximately fifteen Kilometers north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. 2. The 267th Viet Cong Battalion (Main Force) composed of approximately 25 per cent NVA, was the lead battalion and the major assault force in the penetration of the west perimeter. This battalion, like all of the attacking battalions, had a strength of 450 to 500 men. Members of this unit made the deepest penetration into the installation. Its staging area was approximately six Kilometers south of Due Hoa Village, approximately eighteen Kilometers west of the base. 3. The 16th Battalion, Viet Cong (Main Force) AKA D-16 (NVA), was the second unit in line of the assaulting forces. Numerous KIA from this unit were identified inside and immediately outside the perimeter fence. It is probable that this battalion was co-located with or at least in close proximity to the 267th Battalion identified in paragraph (a) above, since the delineation 6 of their lines could not be clearly identified and their dead were co-mingled. The greatest proportion of this unit was NVA. 4. The 269th Viet Cong Battalion (Main Force) was the rear unit in line. It's bivouac area prior to the attack was in the immediate area of Duc Hoa. This unit was engaged from its eastern and southern flank by elements of the 53rd Regional Forces Battalion prior to their arrival at the perimeter fence. 5. The 90th Battalion of the 1st NVA (Cover Number KB-604) Regiment was located in the VINATEXCO factory northwest of the breached perimeter fence. This battalion had 12 mortar positions to the immediate north, west and south of the factory and probably rendered support fire to the assault forces often referred to by interrogated prisoners. This unit sustained 170(+) KIA primarily during the air attack on the factory during the day of 31 January 1968. It has been reported by Vietnamese intelligence sources that among the many casualties in the factory there were 7 NVA pilots and 15 NVA aircraft technicians. 6.
Supporting elements of these battalions or elements of other
unidentified battalions provided supporting artillery fire for the
attacking hostile ground forces. 8. © Security Police Status: a. The total Security Police assigned strength at the time of the hostilities was 890 personnel. Of this total, 75 personnel, or eight percent of the assigned strength, were TDY, R&R, hospital, or emergency leave status or awaiting completion of in-country training. (The TDY personnel included approximately fifty men assigned to three detachments at remote sites.) 7 The
present for duty (PFD) strength was 815 personnel, 56 percent (457) of
which were physically on post at the time of the attack. As a result
of being placed on Red Alert at 1730 hours, 30 January 1968, eight 13
man Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) were formed, equipped, and readied for
immediate response in the event of attack. This totaled 104 men, or 13
percent of the PFD strength. The 262 remaining Security Police
Personnel, or 32 per cent of the PFD strength, were armed and billeted
in the squadron barracks for immediate recall. 8 (b) Alpha Sector 1. Sector NCOIC 1 9 (a)
NCOIC 1
TOTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 101 (4) Others TOTAL OTHERS 5 10
TOTAL ON DUTY
457 (5) Fight 13 man Quick Reaction Teams
104
TOTAL U.S. Security Forces: (377th SPS a. Enemy Losses: The enemy forces sustained 157 KIA (body count) within the base perimeter, and nine POW's were taken by the friendly forces within the same area. Immediately outside the perimeter fence, 267 enemy bodies were counted until the counting action was terminated due to more pressing operational requirements. All of these enemy KIA and POW were probably sustained by the C-10 Sapper Unit, 267th Battalion, 16th Battalion, and the 90th Battalion all of which were identified in paragraph 7b(4)(e) above, The 269th Battalion all of which were identified in paragraph 7b(4)(e) above, which was in ground contact with the 53rd Regional Force Battalion with supporting Light Fire Team dispatched to their area by JDOC, suffered 286 KIA (US confirmed V.C. body count). Friendly elements (2nd Services Battalion and Task Force Peter) operating in the O.F. 10 (Gate 10) area accounted for 82+ enemy dead (body count). The total enemy body count, including the 170+ KIA referred to in para 7b(4)(e)5 above, was 962+. b. Friendly Casualties: KIA KIA 11 TOTAL FRIENDLY KIA ' 55 TOTAL FRIENDLY WIA - 163 c. A total of 145 weapons were captured on the installation, 43 of which were crew-serviced. Figures for the off‑base collection of weapons are not available. d. Aircraft Damage: U.S. Aircraft: e. Structural Damage: (1) 4 Conexes of paint burned (Total Loss) g. Enemy Ordnance Collection: 12
operating outside the installation made frequent contacts with the enemy near the base. These contacts varied in size, but were all part of the total enemy offensive on Tan Son Nhut and the Saigon area. As of 23 February 1968, 5,519 enemy were KIA (body count) in the greater Saigon area. Sweeping, clearing, and rescuring operations by friendly forces are in effect to this date (4 March 1968). The actions of the enemy clearly substantiate the contention that they have no intention of withdrawing from the area and allowing the installation to revert to its previously secure status. This evaluation is further supported by the fact that post‑attack intelligence revealed that the Viet Cong attack forces had no plan for withdrawal of their units. 12.
© Lessons Learned: The concept that Tan Son Nhut Air Base can
be a. Security Police personnel and augmentees (TF-35) were well-supervised and well-trained in fire control and discipline and in basic tactics, but were neither equipped nor trained well enough to effectively counter a regiment-size enemy assault. Consideration should be given to Base Security Police receiving more infantry type training prior to assignment in Southeast Asia. Emphasis should be placed on crew-serviced and heavy weapons, assault tactics, and deployment procedures. Existing Air Force training in the ZI and in Southeast Asia is not sufficient to enable Security Police forces to effectively counter forces of this size, equipped as they were. b. Current concepts of base defense and protection of USAF resources as established by higher headquarter's directives should be reviewed. In our opinion too much emphasis is placed on the close‑in protection of resources. With the weapons available to the enemy, close‑in guards are useless. Security forces must be moved from the revetments and other restricted 14 areas
to the perimeter, where they can effectively engage the enemy.
Further, we must have the capability to respond with properly equipped
reaction forces. In conjunction with this, the existing defense
alignment of the installation must be re‑evaluated and changed
in light of the new enemy tactics encountered. d. A free fire zone/clear area must be established around the perimeter of the base. If free fire zones/clear areas had been established the enemy would not have had easy access to the perimeter fence and much of the small arms activity would not have taken place. These zones would also have prevented the enemy from setting up crew-serviced weapon positions and ammunition supply areas adjacent to the base perimeter. Recommend that the free fire zone be extended at least 1,000 meters around the perimeter. e. Medical personnel should be more readily available to the Security Police. Their training, manning and employment should be such that they would be capable of immediate support to the base defense operation. Entry of medical personnel into the affected area and subsequent evacuation of wounded became an acute problem during the battle. If medical personnel are to continue to be employed in this theater of operation, independent of base defense forces, they must establish and maintain a close liaison with 15
f. A more stringent control of weapons issue to non-defensive force personnel is immediately required. Many of these personnel hampered the Security Police effort and on some occasions were nearly mistaken for hostile forces. Personnel should be instructed to take cover, and weapons should not be issued until Security Condition RED (Option II) is declared. g. It has been determined from battlefield reports that at the point of penetration some personnel of the 2nd Services Battalion (ARVN) deserted their static defense posts. Reasons for the desertion have not been established, but an investigation is being conducted by the Vietnamese authorities. From these reports, it is apparent that there is need for closer coordination between Vietnamese and U.S. Forces involved in the combined defense of an installation. All indications point to an absolute need for the co‑manning of defensive positions throughout the perimeter. h. Local intelligence data available to the base defense forces was entirely void of information pertinent to enemy plans and movements in the immediate area. Defense force personnel must assume that future intelligence reports have questionable validity. They must maintain a posture that will render them totally prepared for an attack at any time, regardless of intelligence indicators. i. The most significant lesson learned from the attack, and the one which requires the most immediate attention, is the need for more and better equipment. Heavier weapons are urgently needed to effectively combat penetrating forces. 16 (1) XM-148 Grenade launchers proved to be difficult to operate under combat conditions. Their use is extremely limited during the hours of darkness as their design requires a special sighting device which is useless during darkness. Recommend we consider bringing M-79 Grenade Launchers back into the Air Force inventory, and its wide variety of ordnance (HE, illumination, canister, white phosphorous, etc.) be obtained for maximum utilization. As an alternate solution, recommend the sighting mechanism of the XM-148 be corrected immediately to allow for effective night‑time employment. (2) Mortars should be considered for direct support illumination and for direct HE fire against attacking ground forces and enemy support fire positions. (3) Recoilless rifles would have been of great assistance in destroying positions adjacent the West perimeter and inside the 051 Bunker. The counter attack would have been started much earlier and completed at less cost to friendly forces if reaction forces had been able to suppress and destroy enemy crew-served positions. (4) Some type of rocket launcher is a must. The Amy has in its inventory a light anti-tank weapon (LAW) which is considered ideal for destroying reinforced enemy positions. The LAW could be carried as part of a Security Alert Team's equipment. The weapon is easily operated and the launcher is disposable after use. Its incorporation into the Security Police inventory would be an immediate and noteworthy improvement. (5) In conjunction with the need for heavier weapons and increased fire power, the safe transportation of this equipment and personnel is a must. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) are considered the most appropriate vehicle for this transportation. These vehicles can be utilized for transportation to the affected area, heavy weapons support fire, and evacuation of injured. 17
(6) It was evident during the attack that the present communications system employed by Security Police personnel was completely unsatisfactory. There is a strong need for more powerful portable units, able to receive all units involved in the defense operation. This would alleviate the problem of units cutting each other out because they did not receive other units transmitting. Power sources which can sustain operational requirements over an extended period of time are necessary for these radio units. Had the installation been subjected to more than one penetration, multi-channel (more than two) radios would have been required to successfully contain and destroy the attacking forces. (7) Direct communications with supporting units (LFTs, AC-47s, Flare Ships, etc.) is an immediate requirement. This capability is essential for effective direct control of supporting units on the scene by in-place Security Police supervisory personnel. During the initial phases of the battle, requests for and direction of specific support fire had to be relayed from on-scene positions through Security Police radio channels to JDOC, which relayed the requests and directions to the supporting units. The resulting time lag made the supporting fire less effective than it would have been if direct communications had been available. J. The above lessons learned of course apply to operations in SEA. We do not intend to imply that these recommendations would apply Air Force wide. 18 (This Page is Unclassified) 13. (U) Security Classification: This report is classified Confidential/ NOFORN because it reflects detailed information relative to damage of U.S. resources resulting from enemy attack and describes counter measures employed by free world forces in response to enemy actions. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part by recipients is authorized on an as needed basis. FOR THE COMMANDER BILLY
J. CARTER, Lt Col, USAF 2 Atch 19 BATTLE DESCRIPTION 1. On
the nights of 30-31 January 1968, all security forces were in
condition Yellow with the exception of the 377th SPS, which was in Condition Red. Atch 1 J.G.S)
reported small arms, fire into their location from off base positions.
A Sector SAT was dispatched. 9. At approximately 0340 hours, the 051 Bunker reported that they had 2 2
3 the
previously dispatched 53/13 R.F. CO patrol engaged what was then
believed to be an enemy platoon. The patrol exchanged fire with the
enemy for approximately five minutes and, due to the enemy's obvious
effort to surround the unit, they withdrew south approximately 200
meters and called in a LFT for assistance. The LFT strafed the area
with MG and rocket fire. A subsequent search of the area revealed 5 VC
KIA at the location of the fire‑fight and 65 VC KIA (Body count)
in the field surrounding the scene. It is believed that this unit was
the reinforcing elements for the attack on the airfield. After
disengaging with no friendly losses the unit moved back to the
Battalion CP for resupply of ammunition. 4
5 22. At
approximately 0515 hours, several units in the blocking positions were
running out of ammunition and requests for resupply were made.
Resupply was accomplished by Security Police and Advisory Team
personnel. The friendly units continued their intense small arms and
automatic weapons fire into the enemy positions, causing heavy enemy
casualties. of the
Bn CP. The order to open fire from both northern CP Bunkers was given. 7 34. At
approximately 0645 hours, the 53rd R.F. CO reported
that a VC Battalion had taken over the village of Tau Phu located at
coordinates XS793854 and had surrounded the CO CP located at
XS794928. The 531 CO commander, took a patrol out to check VC
positions. He was subsequently killed, and the Viet Cong hung his body
in front of the CP and cremated it. At approximately 0645 hours an
element of 53rd R.F. Battalion moved out of the CP to the
northwestern edge of the village of Ba Queo vicinity XS782946, less
than 500 meters SSW of the 051 Bunker, and broke up what is believed
to have been a reinforced two-CO assault team. (A subsequent
search of the area revealed 169 enemy bodies at coordinates XS785954). 8 was
still inside the perimeter. on the
vast perimeter between the 052 and 052A Bunkers. Three LFTs were
downed in the vicinity of the vast perimeter during the morning
battle. 10 placing
the 3/4 Cav, the 53rd RF Battalion, and the reinforced base
perimeter in blocking roles, with the 1/18th Inf Bn
attacking the enemy in a north' westerly direction. This action was
designed to force the enemy's main body to disperse into the blocking
forces. The enemy broke contact just before dark. The enemy had
withdrawn to the southwest into Ba Queo and toward Phu
Tho Hoa. FACs engaged the enemy with artillery fire whenever
possible. The
3/4 Cav reported that it was receiving heavy small arms fire at a
heavy rate from the VINATEXCO Factory. Clearance for a air strike was
obtained and the first strike was conducted by the 33rd VNAF Wing. Subsequent strikes by F-100's resulted in 95% destruction
of the factory. Secondary explosions occurred.
Over 170 VC body count was accredited and a large weapons cache
was located in and around the factory. a. The 2/327/101st Airborne (less I CO) - blocking position behind the 051 Gate area of penetration. b. The 1/18/1st Division (less I CO) - placed in reserve in the southwest section of the base near the 25L runway. c. The 2/27/25th Division (less 1 CO) - mobilized by the 377th Combat Support Group as a rapid reaction force stationed at the U.S. Army Heliport (southwest section of the base). d.
The 3/4 Cav, 25th Division with one CO of the 2/27/25th Division attached - positioned to the immediate south of the 056 Gate (058 Bunker) as a rapid reaction force against the enemy threat from the northwest. e.
One CO of the 2/327/101st and one CO of the
1/18/1st Division placed in perimeter defense around MACV
Headquarters. Disposition of the above elements was completed by 21.00
hours. The base was considered secured at this time. At 2215 hours, Lt
Col Coung resumed command of all Vietnamese forces and Colonel Thebeau
with elements of headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 1st Inf Division, assumed command of all U.S. Army Forces by order of
Major General Ware, Commander) II Field Force Forward. THIS
PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED JDOC -
Joint Defense Operation Center THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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